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This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the interaction of emigration of highly skilled 
labor, an economy’s income gap to potential host economies of expatriates, and optimal 
public infrastructure investment. In a model with endogenous education and R&D investment 
decisions we show that international integration of the market for skilled labor aggravates 
between-country income inequality by harming those which are source economies to begin 
with while benefiting host economies. When brain drain increases in source economies, 
public infrastructure investment is optimally adjusted downward, whereas host economies 
increase it. Evidence from 77 countries well supports our theoretical hypotheses. 
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Policymakers in advanced countries are steadily concerned with attracting highly skilled
workers from abroad or at least to prevent brain drain, particularly from key workers
like researchers and professionals. For instance, in 2000-01, 9.2 million foreign-born
professionals or technicians resided and were employed in an OECD country (OECD,
2007a). 45 percent of those work in the US, whereas Finland, Mexico, Poland and
Slovak Republic experienced large net outﬂows. The most highly skilled are particularly
mobile. Countries like Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland are able to attract, for
instance, many doctorate holders from abroad. In the US, 11.7 percent of all doctorate
holders were foreign citizens and 25.7 percent of the doctorate holders (368,800 people)
were foreign born in 2004; in Switzerland, the respective ﬁg u r e sw e r ea sh i g ha s3 0 . 1
and 41.1 percent in 2003 (Auriol, 2007).1 Many of those emigrated PhDs come from
advanced EU countries, which shows that the drain of the key workforce is not exclusively
a developing country phenomenon. For instance, in 2000, there were 524,922 Britons in
working age (25-64) living in the US; among those, 49.2 percent had enjoyed tertiary
education and 3.9 percent held a PhD (Saint-Paul, 2004). Among French, Spanish and
Italian expatriates arriving at the US between 1990 and 2000 around 9 percent held a
PhD (Saint-Paul, 2004).2 This shows that adverse eﬀects from brain drain of researchers
and professionals in the EU can potentially be very large, as alarmingly discussed by
EU policymakers over the last years (e.g. European Commission, 2003). In view of
the relatively little success of the EU to attract highly skilled labor from abroad, the
European Commission proposed in October 2007 the so-called "blue card" scheme to
signiﬁcantly reduce immigration barriers for high-qualiﬁed workers.
A natural framework to discuss the eﬀects of brain drain of researchers and profes-
sionals features endogenous R&D activity of ﬁrms and endogenous educational choice of
1Figures are more moderate when we look at the broader group of the tertiary educated rather than
on the most highly skilled. The number of immigrants less emigrants as percentage of all residents with
tertiary attainment in 2000 was 9.1 percent in Switzerland and 3.5 percent in the US (OECD, 2007b).
See also Dumont and Lemaître (2005) for an overview on immigrants and expatriates in OECD countries
by level of education.
2By contrast, less than one percent of working-age US citizens earned a PhD degree (Saint-Paul,
2004).
2individuals. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, no such attempt yet exists in the
literature.
This research develops a brain drain model which emphasizes R&D and education
decisions. It theoretically and empirically analyzes the interaction of emigration of highly
skilled labor and an economy’s income gap to potential host economies of expatriates.
O nt h eo n eh a n d ,a sc o m m o ni nb r a i nd r a i nm o d e l s ,h i g hi n c o m ea b r o a dr e l a t i v et ot h e
domestic economy triggers emigration. On the other hand, however, migration ﬂows of
skilled workers aﬀe c ti n c o m ed i ﬀerences across economies. The latter channel is driven by
scale eﬀects which typically arise in models with endogenous R&D investment. In a sam-
ple of 77 countries, we ﬁnd empirical evidence in favor of both channels, separately and
from a structural equation model. Our analysis suggests that labor market integration
(reduction of institutionally related mobility costs for the highly qualiﬁed) aggravates
between-country income inequality. It raises income in economies which attracted skilled
immigrants in the ﬁrst place and harms economies already facing a brain drain. That is,
a reduction in mobility costs accentuates both migration ﬂows and income diﬀerentials
between economies.
We next ask how the government should react to increased migration ﬂows if it
has a policy instrument at hand which can be used to raise productivity, like public
infrastructure investment. Prima facie, one may suspect that countries experiencing
additional brain drain should compensate for the adverse eﬀects by spending more on
productivity-enhancing measures. We show, however, that public infrastructure invest-
ment is optimally adjusted downward when exogenous shocks lead to increased outﬂows
of high-skilled labor.3 Conversely, public investment levels should rise if the economy
is more prone to immigration. Consequently, also diﬀerences in infrastructure spending
across economies are accentuated after internationally integrating markets for skilled
labor.
Our analysis suggests that welfare-maximization is equivalent to a minimization of
brain drain in an economy with positive net emigration. Thus, reducing public infrastruc-
3The result is not due to a decrease in the tax base stemming from additional outﬂows; it would still
hold if individuals were forced to pay taxes in their country of birth, irrespective of their residency.
3ture spending serves to mitigate the brain drain problem. We provide some evidence that,
in line with theoretical considerations, (endogenously) increased migration outﬂows are
accompanied by lower public investment levels.
The earlier literature has emphasized adverse eﬀects of outward migration on the
employment level and welfare of the source country (e.g. Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974).
More recently, however, scholars pointed to potential brain gain eﬀects for the source
economy (e.g., Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998; Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). They show that if emigration prospects of skilled workers
in developing countries are uncertain due to immigration quotas in advanced countries,
a higher quota (better emigration prospect) fosters incentives to acquire education. The
drain eﬀect from higher outﬂows may then be dominated by an increase in the skilled
labor force. While not denying this possibility, our analysis does not emphasize such
am e c h a n i s m . 4 We also abstract from potential gains for source economies from remit-
tances since we are interested in ﬁrst-order eﬀects of migration ﬂows of the highly skilled
on the global distribution of income earned at source.
Another strand of literature has focussed on the implications of brain drain for the
tax system (e.g. Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989; Wildasin, 2000; Anderson and Konrad,
2003; Haupt and Janeba, 2004) and education subsidies (Poutvaara and Kanniainen,
2000; Andersen, 2005). Instead, we focus on the implications on public infrastructure
expenditure for a given tax system. Our focus is also diﬀerent but complementary to
the literature on the implications of brain drain for the public education system (see e.g.
Justman and Thisse, 1997, 2000; Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann, 2007). We assume
that education is private but the government may aﬀe c tf a c t o rp r o d u c t i v i t yb yo t h e r
measures.
4In our model higher emigration rates are associated with a higher fraction of skilled natives too.
However, an increase in the fraction of educated labor does not compensate the skill losses due to
emigration. This is because there is no explicit immigration quota, albeit there exist migration costs.
The migration possibilities are thus known ex ante to individuals in our framework and taken into
account in the education decision. In fact, the empirical relevance of a potential brain gain mechanism
is conﬁned to poor countries with rather low levels of human capital and low emigration rates of the
skilled (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008). However, as we have seen above, brain drain of
researchers and professionals is not necessarily a developing country phenomenon. It is presumably not
relevant for the poorest countries either, due to their lack of suﬃcient quality of the education system.
4Apart from public ﬁnance issues, our paper may be most closely related to Miyagiwa
(1991), who aims to explain why countries like the US can pay high wages to skilled
professionals and therefore attract the best immigrants from abroad. Miyagiwa assumes
that there are increasing returns to education, which implies that the wage level of
educated workers rises with the amount of skilled labor. In our model, such scale eﬀects
are endogenously derived and we provide empirical evidence for them.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the relationship between migration ﬂows and income gaps without
and with optimal adjustment of public infrastructure investment. Section 4 confronts
the main theoretical hypotheses with empirical evidence. The last section 5 provides
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a small economy which is populated by a unit mass of individuals, endowed
with one unit of time. Each individual decides whether or not to become high-skilled,
which requires ¯ e ∈ (0,1) units of time.5 Otherwise, it remains low-skilled. High-skilled
individuals may emigrate at some cost which may diﬀer among individuals. In order
to focus on migration patterns of high skilled workers, we assume that low-skilled labor
is immobile.6 Time not used for education is inelastically supplied to a perfect labor
market.
An individual i living at home cares exclusively about consumption level c(i) of a
homogenous ﬁnal good. If the individual works abroad, utility is given by a discounted
consumption level, c(i)/(1 + θ(i)); see Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), and
Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann (2007), among others. Parameter θ(i) captures, for
instance, individual costs of living in a foreign social environment, which may be aﬀected
by the treatment of foreigners by administrative bodies. It is distributed according to a
5For simplicity, individuals are homogenous with respect to required education time.
6This can be motivated by the fact that migration costs are higher for people with lower education as
they are more likely to have diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job, learning a foreign language and integrating in the
foreign society. Furthermore, institutional barriers in potential host economies may prevent migration
of low-skilled workers.
5continuous p.d.f. ϕ(θ),w i t hs u p p o r tΘ, θ ≥ 0. The c.d.f. of θ is denoted by Φ(θ).W h e n
deciding whether or not to become skilled, individuals take both migration incentives
and costs into account. The net wage rate of skilled labor, aﬀecting migration incentives
as will become apparent, is exogenously given by ¯ wnet.
The ﬁnal good is chosen as numeraire. It is produced under perfect competition,
according to the technology
Y = X
αZ
1−α, 0 <α<1, (1)
where X is a composite input consisting of n intermediate goods and input Z combines
skilled and unskilled labor, HZ and LZ, respectively, according to
Z = B(HZ)
β(LZ)
1−β, 0 <β<1,B> 0.( 2 )











where x(j) denotes the quantity of the intermediate input produced in sector j ∈ [0,n]
and A(j) is the productivity parameter associated with that input.7
There is one ﬁrm in each intermediate goods sector. Intermediate goods producers
can transform one unit of the ﬁnal good into one unit of output. There is a large number
of potential sectors in each economy. Entry is free but requires f>0 units of skilled
labor for setting up a ﬁrm.8 Intermediate goods producers can improve productivity
by employing high-skilled, non-production (“R&D“) labor like scientists, engineers or
managers. In line with the IO literature on innovation activities (e.g., Sutton, 1998),
R&D investment costs are (endogenous) sunk costs for ﬁrms. Productivity A(j) of
7According to (1)-(3), there are constant-returns to scale in ﬁnal goods production.
8Assuming instead that the set up requirement is partly or exclusively in terms of low-skilled labor
is inconsequential for the main results.
6intermediate good producer j which employs h(j) u n i t so fR & Dl a b o ri sg i v e nb y
A(j)=a(h(j)), (4)
where a(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function; moreover, let limh→0 a0(h) →∞
and limh→∞ a0(h)=0 .
A c c o r d i n gt o( 2 ) ,B measures the total factor productivity in the production of
intermediate good Z, referred to as “productivity” in what follows. It may be aﬀected
by public infrastructure investment, G, measured in terms of the ﬁnal good. We assume
B = b(G),w h e r eb(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function with b(0) > 0;
moreover, we assume limG→0 b0(G) →∞and limG→∞ b0(G)=0 . Public infrastructure
investment G is ﬁnanced by proportional wage income taxation. The tax rate is denoted
by τ ∈ (0,1). It applies to all workers employed in the domestic economy (natives and
immigrants, but not emigrants).9
We shall remark that all results would exactly remain the same if (2) and (4) were
replaced by Z =( HZ)β(LZ)1−β and A(j)=Ba(h(j)), respectively; that is, instead of
raising productivity in Z−production, an increase in G would improve productivity of
the R&D process. Thus, G may be interpreted as public infrastructure spending in a
broad sense. One important question we wish to address is how (benevolent) national
governments react to declining labor mobility costs, and possibly larger migration ﬂows,
if they have an instrument at hand which improves the economy’s productivity.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection we analyze the equilibrium for given public investment, G.
9The assumption is made for concreteness. Results would be unchanged if immigrants were not be
obliged to pay taxes or if emigrants still have to pay taxes at home, as will become apparent.
73.1 R&D decision
We start with the decision of intermediate good ﬁrms. In view of the technology for ﬁnal
goods production, the inverse demand function for the latest version of intermediate











according to (1) and (3). Recalling that each ﬁrm has marginal cost of unity, “operating
proﬁts” (sales revenue minus production costs) of ﬁrm j are given by
π(j)= m a x
p(j),x(j)
[p(j) − 1]x(j) s.t. (5).
It is easy to show that prices are set according to p(j)=1 /α and intermediate good
output levels are given by x(j)=α
2
1−αA(j)Z. Thus, resulting operating proﬁts of a ﬁrm
j read π(j)=δA(j)Z,w h e r eδ ≡ (1 − α)α
1+α
1−α. Observing sunk costs and the R&D
technology (4) a ﬁrm j solves
max
h(j)
δZa(h(j)) − wh(j) − wf, (6)
where w denotes the wage rate for skilled labor. As ﬁrms are small, they take intermedi-
ate production level Z as given. The ﬁrst-order condition associated with optimization




Free entry implies that ﬁrms enter as long as operating proﬁts (π = δZa(h)) exceed
sunk costs, w(h + f); thus, in equilibrium,
δZa(h)=w(h + f). (8)
From (7), (8) and the properties of function a(h) we ﬁnd that there exists a unique R&D
8labor input per ﬁrm, h, which is implicitly given by
a(h) − a
0(h)(h + f)=0 . (9)
h only depends on the R&D technology and set up requirement f. In particular, it
does neither depend on migration ﬂows nor on public infrastructure expenditure.
3.2 Educational choice and equilibrium wages
Let q denote the domestic wage rate for unskilled labor. If not all skilled workers are
migrating, in equilibrium, w(1 − ¯ e)=q must hold.10 Denote the total number of (the
endogenously determined) skilled and unskilled natives by H and L, respectively, i.e.,
H + L =1 , and the mass of skilled emigrants by m. In equilibrium with labor market
clearing, we have LZ = L and HZ + n(h + f)=( 1− ¯ e)(H − m).11 Thus, H =1− L
implies
(1 − ¯ e)L + HZ + n(h + f)=( 1− ¯ e)(1 − m). (10)
We next derive the equilibrium wage rate for skilled labor, w,a n dt h ef r a c t i o no fn a t i v e s
choosing education, H, for a given amount of emigrants, m. For this, we use (7), (9),
(10), w(1− ¯ e)=q, H +L =1together with the facts that price pZ for the intermediate
input Z equals marginal productivity of the ﬁnal goods sector for this input, ∂Y/∂Z,
and that wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor are equal the respective marginal
productivity in that sector, w = pZ∂Z/∂HZ and q = pZ∂Z/∂LZ.W et h u se n du pw i t h
eight equations, for the eight unknowns w, q, pZ, HZ, H, L, h,a n dn. Solving the system
we obtain:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium for a given amount of emigrants, m,t h ew a g er a t ef o r
skilled labor is given by
w = ξBa
0(h)(1 − m), (11)
where ξ ≡ δβ
β (1 − β)
1−β (1−¯ e)β
1+α is an unessential constant, and the fraction of skilled
10Recall that individuals have identical time costs, ¯ e, to become skilled.
11Recall that skilled individuals work only a fraction (1 − ¯ e) of their time.
9natives reads
H =
α + β +( 1− β)m
1+α
. (12)
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. One can also show that per capita output
of the ﬁnal good, y ≡ Y
1−m,i sg i v e nb yy = ˜ ξBa0(h)(1−m),w h e r e˜ ξ ≡
(1−¯ e)ξ
(1−α)(1+α).T h u s ,
y and wage rates are proportional to each other (see (11)) and positively depend on the
“scale” of the domestic labor force, 1 − m; y and w therefore decline in the number of
emigrants m.S u c has c a l ee ﬀect is in line with almost all models of endogenous technical
change.12
Three further remarks are in order. First, according to (9), there is no scale eﬀect
regarding R&D labor input per ﬁrm and thus no scale eﬀect regarding average produc-
tivity of intermediate goods ﬁrms. This is because larger scale, and thus larger market
size, means that more ﬁr m se n t e rt h ee c o n o m y ,i nap r o p o r t i o n a lw a y . 13 This feature of
the model is consistent with recent empirical evidence provided by Laincz and Peretto
(2006) in the context of vertical innovation models.14 Second, note that raising produc-
tivity B has a lower eﬀects on the wage rate w the higher the number of emigrants (m)
is. This insight plays an important role for the policy analysis in subsection 3.4. Third,
note from (12) that the number of high-skilled individuals (H) is positively associated
with the number of migrants, m. This is due to the complementarity of skilled and
unskilled labor in the production of the intermediate input Z. Higher brain drain means
that a lower amount of skilled labor is employed at home, which in turn raises the mar-
ginal productivity of skilled relative to unskilled labor and therefore fosters education
incentives. However, we have Hm < 1, which implies that an increase in H is lower than
the loss because of brain drain.15 Moreover, H>mwhenever m<1, i.e., both skilled
and unskilled natives work in the considered economy.
12See Grossmann (2008) for an exception. For a comprehensive survey, see Jones (2005).
13See the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix.
14In vertical innovation models, R&D is targeted to productivity-improvements, like in this paper.
Proportionality of ﬁrm size to the size of the domestic labor force is a key feature in this class of models.
See Grossmann and Steger (2007) for a discussion.
15This is diﬀerent to recent models with uncertain individual prospects to migrate, like Mountford
(1997) or Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998). In our model, individuals know in advance
their migration costs.
103.3 Migration
We turn next to the migration decision of individuals. Let wnet ≡ (1 − τ)w be the
net wage rate a skilled worker earns at home (whereas ¯ wnet is earned abroad). As
consumption equals after-tax wage income and is discounted by θ(i) when moving abroad,
an individual i emigrates if ¯ wnet ≥ (1 + θ(i))wnet. This condition can be rewritten as
θ(i) ≤ χ − 1,w h e r eχ ≡ ¯ wnet/wnet is the relative after-tax wage abroad. Thus, if χ ≥ 1,
then the number of emigrants is given by m =
χ−1 R
0
ϕ(θ)dθ = Φ(χ − 1). Suppose that in
t h ec a s ew h e r eχ<1, there will be immigration of I(χ) workers, i.e., m = −I(χ).W e
assume that I(χ) is a decreasing function (i.e. immigration rises if the relative wage χ





Φ(χ − 1) if χ ≥ 1,
−I(χ) otherwise.
(13)
Note that m increases if the relative after-tax wage abroad, χ, increases. Moreover, if
χ =1 ,t h e nm =0 .
The government budget constraint for ﬁnancing public infrastructure, given tax rate
τ,r e a d sG = τ[qL + w(1 − ¯ e)(H − m)]. Using equilibrium condition q = w(1 − ¯ e) and
H + L =1 ,w eh a v eτw = G
(1−¯ e)(1−m). Employing the latter expression together with
(11), it follows that the after-tax wage of skilled labor is given by
wnet = ξBa
0(h)(1 − m) −
G
(1 − ¯ e)(1 − m)
≡ W(m,B,G). (14)
Not surprisingly, higher productivity, B = b(G), makes an economy less prone to
brain drain (WB > 0), all other things being equal. This holds because equilibrium
wages are increasing in productivity. However, raising B = b(G) by enhancing public
infrastructure investment, G, comes at the cost of higher tax payments. This lowers net
wages (WG < 0) and through this eﬀect fosters emigration. Outward migration of skilled
workers has two negative eﬀects on net wage rate wnet in the domestic economy, all other
things equal: ﬁrst, the gross wage declines due to the scale eﬀect described in subsection
113.2 and, second, the tax base shrinks which in turn lowers after-tax income for a given
public spending level; formally Wm < 0.16
Let us deﬁne ˜ W(m,G) ≡ W(m,b(G),G). According to (14) and b00(G) < 0,f o r
a given number of migrants, m, net wages are strictly concave as a function of public
infrastructure investment, G,i . e . , ˜ WGG < 0. (This property is important when we turn
to optimal policy setting below.) Moreover, we can write the relative after-tax wage




≡ ˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet).( 1 5 )
As emigration has a negative eﬀect on the net wage at home (Wm < 0), the relative wage
rate abroad rises with m (˜ χm > 0). Thus, there exists a unique threshold level, m,s u c h
that ˜ χ(m,G,¯ wnet)=1 .W eh a v em < 0 if and only if ˜ χ(0,G,¯ wnet) > 1, i.e., m < 0 is
associated with a premium on net wages abroa di nt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sn om i g r a t i o n
(m =0 ). Similarly, m > (=)0 if and only if ˜ χ(0,G,¯ wnet) < (=)1. Combining (13) and
(15), we obtain:
Lemma 2. (i) In an equilibrium with m ≥ m, the number of emigrants, m,i s
implicitly given by
m = Φ(˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet) − 1) ≡ M(m,G, ¯ wnet), (16)
where M is increasing in m;i fϕ is non-decreasing, M is also strictly convex as a
function of m. (ii) In an equilibrium with m<m , there is immigration (m<0), where
m is implicitly given by m = −I(˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet)).
Let ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet) denote the equilibrium number of migrants (emigrants if ˆ m>mand
immigrants if ˆ m<m ). An equilibrium ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet) with emigration is implicitly deﬁned
by m = M(m,G, ¯ wnet).F o r m>m , the three panels in Fig. 1 graph possible curves
of M(m,G,
_
wnet) as a function of m, called M−curves.17 Graphically, ˆ m is determined
16If emigrants would be obliged to pay taxes in the source country, only the ﬁrst eﬀect was present.
As still Wm < 0 in this case, results would remain qualitatively unchanged.
17Note from (16) that the shape of the M−curve critically depends on the c.d.f. of mobility costs, Φ,
12by the intersection of the M−curve with the 45-degree line. Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows
as i t u a t i o nw h e r em =0such that there is an equilibrium without any migration,
ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet)=0 . Moreover, there is a second equilibrium with positive migration. The
potential multiplicity of equilibrium arises from the fact that higher emigration lowers
net wages at home (recall Wm < 0) and thus makes emigration even more attractive.
Panel (b) depicts a case where m < 0,t h eM−curve is S-shaped, and for the solid line
there are three equilibria with emigration.18 Panel (c) depicts a case where m > 0 and
there are two equilibria with emigration. For m<m , we have three additional equilibria
with immigration.
<Figure 1 here>
Throughout, we focus our comparative-static analysis on equilibria which are stable
according to the standard notion: Consider an equilibrium with emigration, ˆ m>0.
Suppose that in the case where emigration would slightly decrease to ˜ m<ˆ m,t h er e l a t i v e
net wage abroad (χ) adjusts such that M (˜ m,G, ¯ wnet) > ˜ m. Similarly, if emigration
increased to ˜ m>ˆ m, then the resulting number of migrants would fall below ˜ m.T h e
equilibrium with ˆ m>0 is thus “stable” in the sense that small perturbations lead to
a tendency of equilibrium to return to its initial level. Fig. 1 reveals that this is the
case if Mm (ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet) < 1. Otherwise, if Mm (ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet) > 1, the equilibrium is called
“unstable”, as slightly decreasing emigration to ˜ m<ˆ m would lead to less migration,
M (˜ m,G, ¯ wnet) < ˜ m, and slightly increasing emigration to ˜ m>ˆ m w o u l dl e a dt oh i g h e r
emigration. In the case of immigration, we apply an analogous notion of stability. An
equilibrium with immigration is thus stable if −I0(˜ χ)˜ χm < 1 holds in equilibrium.
In panel (a) of Fig. 1, there is only one stable equilibrium, which is the one where
ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet)=m =0 . The equilibrium with positive emigration is unstable. If the
M−curve is like the solid line depicted in panel (b) of Fig. 1, the equilibria with ˆ m1
and ˆ m3 are both stable whereas the equilibrium in the middle, ˆ m2, is unstable. In panel
which is exogenously given.
18A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a2 ,Mmm ≤ 0 requires that the p.d.f. of mobility costs must be strictly
decreasing, i.e., ϕ0 < 0, in the relevant range; otherwise, the M−curve is strictly convex, as in panel (a).
13(c), there is only one stable equilibrium with emigration, but two stable equilibria with
immigration.
We next examine the eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ef o r e i g nw a g e , ¯ wnet,a n do fad e c r e a s e
in mobility costs, for given public infrastructure investment. A decrease in mobility costs
is deﬁn e da sas h i f ti nt h ec . d . f .o fθ,f r o mΦ(θ) to ˜ Φ(θ), such that ˜ Φ(θ) > Φ(θ) for all θ in
the interior of support Θ (i.e., Φ(θ) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates ˜ Φ(θ)). In words:
for any given θ, the share of individuals with mobility costs higher than θ increases and
the share of individuals with costs lower than θ declines. Moreover, we say that the
economy becomes more prone to immigration if there is a shift from I(χ) to ˜ I(χ) such
that I(χ) > ˜ I(χ) for all χ ∈ (0,1). The following comparative-static results hold.
Proposition 1. Assume that at least one stable equilibrium exists.19 Then for a
given public investment level G the following holds:
(i) Suppose ˆ m = m =0initially. If mobility costs decline, then still ˆ m =0 .I f ¯ wnet
increases, then emigration becomes positive ( ˆ m>0).
(ii) Let ˆ mhigh be the number of emigrants in a stable equilibrium ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet) > 0
where emigration is highest. If mobility cost decline or if ¯ wnet increases, then ˆ mhigh
increases (higher emigration) and the corresponding equilibrium net wage rate for skilled
labor, W(ˆ mhigh,B,G),d e c l i n e s .
(iii) Let ˆ mlow be the number of immigrants in a stable equilibrium ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet) < 0
where immigration is highest. If the economy becomes more prone to immigration or if
¯ wnet declines, then ˆ mlow decreases (higher immigration) and W(ˆ mlow,B,G) increases.
Higher labor mobility means that for any relative wage abroad, χ>1,m o r ew o r k e r s
are willing to migrate. Thus, as depicted for the dotted line in panel (a) as well as for both
the dotted and dashed lines in panel (b) in Fig. 1, the M−curve from shifts upward. As
m is unchanged by deﬁnition (recall ˜ χ(m,G,¯ wnet)=1 ), the stable equilibrium without
emigration in panel (a) is unchanged. In contrast, if the net wage rate abroad ( ¯ wnet)
rises, χ increases and thus the M−curve shifts upward also for m =0 ; in addition, m
19It may be the case that a stable equilibrium exists for some c.d.f. Φ and foreign net wage ¯ wnet, but
fails to exist after a decrease in mobility cost or an increase in the foreign net wage rate. To avoid only
mildly interesting case distinctions, we do not consider such a scenario in what follows.
14falls below zero. Consequently, in the new (stable) equilibrium, a positive amount of
workers emigrate. This explains part (i) of Proposition 1. Now consider part (ii). For
both the solid and the dotted M−curve in panel (b) of Fig. 1 there are two stable
equilibria. After a decrease in mobility cost (dotted curve) both the lower one and the
higher one are associated with higher emigration than ˆ m1 and ˆ m3, respectively. For
a larger reduction in mobility costs, leading to the dashed M−curve, the stable low-
emigration equilibrium vanishes (as does the unstable equilibrium). In any case, the
highest emigration level in a stable equilibrium (ˆ mhigh) rises. Moreover, as emigration
has a negative eﬀect on wages (recall Wm < 0), moving from one stable equilibrium to
another one which is associated with a higher number of emigrants triggers a fall in the
equilibrium wage rate for both skilled and unskilled labor (recall q =( 1− ¯ e)w). An
increase in the net foreign wage, ¯ wnet, again shifts the M−curve upwards and lowers
m. It therefore triggers higher emigration (provided the equilibrium is stable), in turn
depressing wage rates at home. The opposite results hold when the economy becomes
more prone to immigration which means that function I(χ) shifts. In panel (c), this is
indicated by a downward shift from the solid to the dotted curve for the range m<m ,
resulting in an increase of the (highest) number of immigrants (decrease of ˆ mlow). This
explains part (iii) of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 suggests that, for given public expenditure G, both migration ﬂows and
wage diﬀerences among economies are accentuated if mobility costs decline. Interesting
questions which arise from this result are: Should a (benevolent) government raise the
level of public investment (G) to increase productivity B in response to lower mobility
costs, for instance, in order to possibly compensate non-migrating workers for the wage
decline following higher brain drain? Moreover, how does the optimal policy response
depend on the direction of the accentuated migration ﬂow? These questions are analyzed
next.
153.4 Optimal Public Investment Policy
If there is more than one stable equilibrium, then which one materializes depends on the
beliefs of skilled workers about the migration pattern. In equilibrium, beliefs must be
identical. We assume that the government anticipates these beliefs when choosing public
investment policy G.
To analyze policy setting behavior, we ﬁrst have to formulate a government objective
or “welfare measure”. We assume that governments exclusively care about utility of
native individuals living in the domestic economy (non-migrants), given by consumption
level c(i). This may be the case, for instance, because non-migrants represent the median
voter in the economy. Since consumption equals domestic after-tax wage income (which
is the same for skilled and unskilled workers, as individuals are identical ex ante), the
government aims to maximize
wnet = ˜ W(ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet),G) ≡ ˆ W(G, ¯ wnet). (17)
We denote the government’s optimal expenditure by ˆ G(¯ wnet)[≡ argmaxG≥0 ˆ W(G, ¯ wnet)]
and show the following.
Proposition 2. Assume that at least one stable equilibrium exists. The optimal
public expenditure level, ˆ G, minimizes emigration from a source economy or maximizes
immigration to a host economy; that is, ˆ mG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)=0and ˆ mGG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) > 0 hold.
Proposition 2 highlights the adverse eﬀects of brain drain for a source economy, or
the beneﬁcial eﬀects of immigration for a host economy, for income and welfare of non-
migrants in the model. It shows that welfare maximization through public infrastructure
investment policy is, in a source country, equivalent to minimizing brain drain. In a host
economy, it is equivalent to maximizing the inﬂow of skilled workers. We next show in
which direction the optimal infrastructure investment changes if mobility costs decline
and, therefore, migration ﬂows accentuate.
Proposition 3. Assume that at least one stable equilibrium exists.
16(i) Suppose ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)=m =0initially. If mobility costs decline, then optimal
public investment level, ˆ G, remains unchanged. If ¯ wnet increases, then ˆ G declines.
(ii) Let ˆ mhigh be the number of emigrants in a stable equilibrium ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) > 0
where emigration is highest, given the optimal policy choice, ˆ G. If mobility cost decline
or if ¯ wnet increases, then ˆ G decreases and the corresponding equilibrium net wage rate
for skilled labor, ˜ W(ˆ mhigh, ˆ G),d e c l i n e s .
(iii) Let ˆ mlow be the number of immigrants in a stable equilibrium ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) < 0
where immigration is highest, given ˆ G. If the economy becomes more prone to immigra-
tion or if ¯ wnet declines, then ˆ G increases and ˜ W(ˆ mhigh, ˆ G) increases.
Proposition 3 suggests that declining mobility costs not only accentuate migration
ﬂows and income diﬀerences among economies (Proposition 1), but also accentuate pub-
lic investment spending levels: Economies which experience further brain drain optimally
choose to lower public investment ˆ G whereas economies which experience further immi-
gration of skilled labor increase ˆ G. The intuition for this result can be seen from Figure
2, which depicts welfare ˜ W(m,G)=W(m,b(G),G) for two levels of m.
< Figure 2 here >
If the number of emigrants increases from m1 to m2 >m 1 (or the number of immi-
grants decreases), not only net wages fall (recall ˜ Wm = Wm < 0) but also the marginal
gain in net wages from an increase in public investment G declines ( ˜ WGm < 0). The
latter property stems from a combination of two eﬀects which go in the same direction:
ﬁrst, the marginal income gain from raising productivity B declines if there is higher
emigration (or less immigration);20 second, the necessary increase in the income tax rate
when raising public infrastructure investment G rises (so to balance the public budget).21
Graphically, as shown in Fig. 2, a higher migration outﬂow shifts welfare as a function of
20Formally, WBm < 0, according to (14).
21The latter property, WGm < 0,w o u l dm o d i f yt oWGm =0if migrants would still have to pay taxes
at home (for instance, because they commute for work abroad but live in the economy where they are
born and residence-based taxation applies). Consequently, ˜ WGm < 0 would still hold in this case. Also
the agglomeration eﬀects which give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria are only partly driven
by the assumption that individuals are taxed where they work. All results would qualitatively remain
the same if we relaxed that assumption. The crucial feature of the model are scale eﬀects in wage levels,
not tax eﬀects.
17G (which is strictly concave as we have already seen that ˜ WGG < 0)n o to n l yd o w n w a r d
but also to the left.
For instance, if ˆ m>0 is a stable equilibrium, then brain drain is accentuated if
mobility cost decline or the net wage abroad, ¯ wnet, rises (part (ii) of Proposition 1). As a
result, welfare as a function of G s h i f t sa ss h o w ni nF i g .2a n dt h eo p t i m a li n f r a s t r u c t u r e
investment, ˆ G, declines (part (ii) of Proposition 3). The other parts of Proposition 3
follow analogously.
We shall stress that we do not literally believe in the benevolent government for
positive analysis. However, the changing trade-oﬀ between public investment provision
and net wages after a change in the number of migrants may induce governments to
reduce public spending even in more sophisticated political economy models.
4 Empirical Evidence
Two main hypotheses emerge from the theoretical section. The ﬁrst one concerns the
interaction between migration ﬂows from or into an economy and wage income (relative
to potential source or host economies). This interaction is reﬂected in Proposition 1
when holding the public infrastructure investment constant and in Proposition 3 when
endogenous adjustment of G is accounted for. The second hypothesis concerns the
interaction between the adjustment of optimal public infrastructure investment ( ˆ G)a n d
(endogenous) changes in migration ﬂows, as suggested by Proposition 3. More precisely,
the following testable predictions can be derived from the theoretical model.
• A higher income gap to potential host economies leads to a higher ‘emigration
rate’, i.e., the emigration level per skilled worker of an economy (Hypothesis 1a).
This prediction captures that the emigration rate is an increasing function of the
income gap (χ − 1); formally, it follows from m = Φ(χ − 1).22
• The higher the income gap to potential host economies, the higher is the (sub-
22According to (12), the emigration rate is given by m/H =( 1+α)[1−β+(α+β)/m]−1.T h u s ,t h e r e
is a positive relationship between m and m/H. Bringing our model to the data, we focus on emigration
rates (m/H), rather than level m,t oa c c o u n tf o rd i ﬀerences in population size.
18sequent) change in the emigration rate (Hypothesis 1b). This prediction follows
from the insight that an integration of the market for skilled labor (reduction in
mobility costs) induces higher emigration in a source economy, for a given income
gap; the increased migration outﬂow reﬂects adjustment to equilibrium.23
• A higher emigration rate in an economy causes a higher income gap to other
economies, all other things equal (Hypothesis 1c). This prediction reﬂects that
brain drain induces scale eﬀects (associated with the R&D process) in our theoret-
ical model which lead to increases in income gaps to other countries (increases in
χ);24 formally, the hypothesis reﬂects the relationship χ =˜ χ(m,·).
• A change in emigration rates is positively related to a change i nt h ei n c o m eg a p
to potential host economies (Hypothesis 1d); both are simultaneously determined.
This prediction captures the equilibrium interactions reﬂected in Proposition 1
(without adjustment in G) and Proposition 3 (with adjustment in G): for instance,
if mobility costs decline, both income gaps and emigration rates increase.
• A change in the emigration rate is negatively related to a change in the public
investment level (Hypothesis 2). Analogously to Hypothesis 1d, this prediction
reﬂects that changes in ˆ m and changes in ˆ G are simultaneously triggered by ex-
ogenous events, like labor market integration, according to Proposition 3.
We ideally would want to construct net emigration rates, as countries are typically
both source and host economies of skilled workers. Immigration data is, unfortunately,
not available for a suﬃciently large set of countries. However, the lack of immigration
data may not lead to a large bias if countries with high gross emigration rates also have
systematically higher net emigration rates, which seems plausible. Before we present
empirical tests of the hypotheses, we ﬁrst describe the data.
23Although the presented model is static for simplicity, the empirical analysis thus allows for adjust-
ment processes. Formally, motivated by (16) and our notion of stability of equilibrium, one may think
of an evolution of migration stock m over time (t)a c c o r d i n gt omt = Φ(˜ χ(mt−1,·) − 1).
24Whereas brain drain refers to emigration ﬂows, the hypothesis relates the income gap to potential
host economies of an economy to its emigration rate, that is, to its stock of emigration. As emigration
stocks reﬂect accumulated migration outﬂows, the hypothesis refers to accumulated scale eﬀects which
amount to observed income gaps.
194.1 Data
The ﬁrst main variable of interest is the emigration rate of high skilled individuals.
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) have established a dataset of emigration stocks and rates
by educational attainment for the years 1990 and 2000. The authors count as emigrants
all foreign-born individuals aged at least 25 who live in an OECD country and class them
by educational attainment and country of origin. To obtain the emigration rate for a
speciﬁc source country, the emigration stock is divided by the total number of people
born in the source country and belonging to the same educational category. Thus, only
emigration into OECD countries is captured, approximately 90 % of educated migrants
in the world.25 As we are interested in the migration pattern of high skilled individuals,
we focus on emigration rates of the high educational category provided by Docquier and
Marfouk (2006); it is denoted by Mig1990 and Mig2000 for the years 1990 and 2000,
respectively.
Our second main variable of interest are income gaps to potential host or source
economies (both triggering and being aﬀected by migration). We take the diﬀerence
between the median of log GDP per capita of the G7 countries and log GDP per capita
of a country for the years 1990 and 2000 (GDPgap1990, GDPgap2000).26
Our theoretical analysis suggests that emigration rates are aﬀected (besides by in-
come gaps) by the distribution of mobility costs. To capture cross-country diﬀerences
in mobility costs in our migration regressions (test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b), we also
a c c o u n tf o rt h en o t i o nt h a tm i g r a t i o np o s s i b i l i t i e sm i g h tb ei n ﬂuenced by historical ties
to other countries. For instance, a common language of host and source country is as-
sociated with low mobility costs for potential emigrants, all other things equal. This
is captured by including legal origins of a country in the speciﬁcations (LegalBritish,
LegalFrench). Moreover, emigration rates may be related to the population size (Pop)
of a country, for at least two reasons.27 First, some host countries have immigration
25See Docquier and Makfouk (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning data collection and construc-
tion issues.
26Recall that in our theoretical model gross wage income (w, q)a n dp e rc a p i t aG D P( y) are propor-
tional to each other. We take gross income levels as proxies for net income.
27We also experimented by using the area of countries as additional control; it has negligible eﬀects
once population size is accounted for and leaves other results basically unchanged.
20quotas which ﬁx the maximum number of immigrants from a speciﬁc country. These
quotas do not vary systematically with size of a source country. Thus, the possibility
of emigration is lower (migration costs are higher) for larger countries than for smaller
ones (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). Second, workers with speciﬁc skills may
ﬁnd out that employment opportunities are better elsewhere due to asymmetric skill
demand shocks across regions. Since in a larger country the dispersion in the demand
for speciﬁc skills across regions is higher, there is less migration to foreign countries (and
more internal migration) in larger countries in response to an adverse skill demand shock
in a region.28 In sum, we expect higher population size to reduce the emigration rate.
In order to control for other factors than brain drain which may aﬀect income gaps
(test of Hypothesis 1c), we employ a number of additional standard controls (again, as
gap to the median value in G7 countries of the respective variable). These are primary
and tertiary school enrollment (PrimSchoolGap, TertSchoolGap), the investment share
(InvestGap), and the share of urban population (UrbanGap). We also include geograph-
ical variables. These are supposed to capture income diﬀerences which could be led back
to more fundamental factors.
Data availability allows us to employ observations for 77 countries to address Hy-
potheses 1a-1d. Table 1 provides the variable deﬁnitions, data sources, and country
names; it also contains descriptive statistics of the employed variables.
< Table 1 here >
To address Hypothesis 2, we employ several indicators for public infrastructure in-
vestment, G: Government investment from the OECD database (focussing on OECD
countries only), and two variables from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (avail-
able also for some non-OECD countries), “Government Acquisition of Fixed Assets” and
“Government Capital Expenditure”.
28See, for instance, Wildasin (2000) who points out that labor market integration insures workers
with speciﬁc skills who face the risk of regional labor demand shocks.
214.2 Estimation Strategy
Our empirical speciﬁcations have to deal with the problem of endogeneity. We solve this
problem in two diﬀerent ways: using lagged variables for Hypotheses 1a-1c and estimating
a structural equation model for Hypotheses 1d. A structural equation model would also
be required to test Hypothesis 2. Due to the lack of data for public investment for a
broader range of countries, we unfortunately are conﬁned to present simple correlations
between changes in migration rates and changes in public investment measures to support
Hypothesis 2.
Regarding Hypotheses 1a-1c, using lagged variables to identify speciﬁc mechanisms
takes into account that migration reacts to income gaps with some delay, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 1a then suggests to estimate:
Mig2000i = α0 + α1GDPgap1990i + z
0
iαz + ui, (18)
where i is the country index. The theoretical model predicts α1 > 0. To capture that
migration rates still adjust after an exogenous event to an equilibrium (Hypothesis 1b),
we also estimate
DeltaMigi = β0 + β1GDPgap1990i + z
0
iβz + ηi, (19)
where DeltaMig ≡ Mig2000−Mig1990 is the change in the emigration rate. We expect
that β1 ≥ 0, with strict inequality when the (stable) stationary equilibrium has not yet
been reached. Hypothesis 1c looks at the (accumulated) impact of emigration rates on
income gaps, capturing scale eﬀects present in the theoretical model with endogenous
R&D investments:
GDPgap2000i = γ0 + γ1Mig1990i + γ2DeltaMigi + x
0
iγz + εi. (20)
x and z denote vectors of controls (typically lagged variables), u, η and ε are error terms.
Note we separate the eﬀects until 1990 and after 1990 (until 2000). The theoretical model
predicts γ1,γ2 ≥ 0.
22To address Hypothesis 1d, which refers to the equilibrium interaction between changes
in emigration rates and income changes after exogenous events (Proposition 1 and 3),
we estimate a structural equation model with a full information three stage least square
(3SLS) estimator.29 We jointly estimate:
DeltaMigi = δ0 + δ1DeltaGDPgapi +˜ z
0
iδz + ςi, (21)
DeltaGDPgapi = ν0 + ν1DeltaMigi + ˜ x
0
iνz + ξi, (22)
where DeltaGDPgap ≡ GDPgap2000 − GDPgap1990 is the change in the (log of)
t h ei n c o m eg a p . ˜ x and ˜ z denote vectors of controls, ς and ξ are error terms. The
theoretical model suggests δ1,ν1 > 0.F o r i d e n t i ﬁcation we need to ﬁnd instruments
for the dependent variables in (21) and (22). As an instrument for the change in the
emigration rate between 1990 and 2000 (DeltaMig) we use the emigration rate in 1990
(Mig1990). According to our model, we should ﬁnd a positive relation between Mig1990
and DeltaMig. Proposition 1 suggests that emigration becomes more pronounced after
labor market integration if there is already emigration, and analogously for immigra-
tion.30 Moreover, there does not seem to be an important reason why a higher initial
emigration rate should aﬀect changes in income gaps through other channels than its
impact on the evolution of emigration patterns. As an instrument for the change in the
income gap to median GDP per capita G7 countries between 1990 and 2000 (DeltaGap)
we employ the investment share in 1990 (InvestS1990). This choice is motivated by
neoclassical growth theory. We implicitly employ the notion that the investment share
aﬀects changes in emigration rates only through changing income gaps.
We test for possible endogeneity of the variables DeltaMig and DeltaGDPgap by
using a Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test. Hausman (1978) originally proposed a test
statistic for endogeneity based upon a direct comparison of coeﬃcient values. Here,
we use the Hausman test version proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1989), which
29A 3SLS estimator basically combines two stage least squares (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR). See supplementary material for details.
30This may hold also because a high level of immigrants in a country means that new immigrants
may ﬁnd a social network (for instance, consisting of emigrated relatives) in that country. In this sense,
the mobility cost distribution may depend on past emigration.
23carries out the test by running an auxiliary regression. In the ﬁrst regression, the sus-
pect endogenous variable is regressed on all exogenous variables and the instruments
to retrieve the residuals. Then in the second regression, the residuals are included as
additional regressors in the estimation of interest. If the estimates are consistent, then
the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst stage residuals should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We also compare our 3SLS estimator to a 2SLS estimator by using another Hausman
test. The null hypothesis of the test is that all exogenous variables are uncorrelated with
the disturbance terms. In this case both the 2SLS and the 3SLS estimator are consistent
but only the 3SLS estimator is (asymptotically) eﬃcient. This is the main justiﬁcation
for us to use a 3SLS approach. Under the alternative hypothesis the 2SLS estimator is
consistent but the 3SLS estimator is inconsistent.
4.3 Results
< Table 2 here >
F i r s tw el o o ka tt h ee ﬀects of a country’s income gap to potential host or source coun-
tries in 1990 on the emigration rate in 2000. The results in Tab. 2 are consistent with
Hypothesis 1a. In the large sample (columns (1)-(5)), the coeﬃcient on GDPgap1990 is
positive (α1 > 0) and statistically diﬀerent from zero below the 5 percent level. Using
weighted least squares (column (5)) rather than OLS does not change results substan-
tially. Column (6) refers to an estimation with OECD countries only. The coeﬃcient on
GDPgap1990 becomes larger but somewhat less signiﬁcant. As expected, higher pop-
ulation size (Pop) has a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the emigration rate.
Legal origin is much less important, although an English legal origin seems to facilitate
migration.
< Table 3 here >
According to Tab. 3, which tests Hypothesis 1b, higher income gaps also seem to
trigger increases in emigration rates in the expected way (β1 > 0). The interpretation
is that past changes in mobility costs lead to equilibrium adjustment. A higher initial
24emigration rate (Mig1990) is also positively related to changes in the emigration rate
(although signiﬁcant between the 5 and 10 percent level only). This means that there is
support for the notion that emigration becomes more pronounced over time (e.g., after
an institutionally rooted decrease in mobility costs). Neither population size nor legal
origin seem to aﬀect changes in the migration pattern. Focussing on OECD countries
only, coeﬃcients on both GDPgap1990 and Mig1990 become insigniﬁcant, suggesting
that within the OECD migration patterns are closer to equilibrium.
< Table 4 here >
Tab. 4 shows how income (GDPgap2000)i sa ﬀected by emigration patterns (Hy-
pothesis 1c). It emerges that only more recent changes in emigration rates (DeltaMig)
matter for income gaps to potential host countries (γ2 > 0) whereas migration ﬂows
before 1990 (captured by Mig1990)h a v en od i s c e r n i b l ee ﬀect (γ1 is never statistically
diﬀerent from zero and sometimes even has the "wrong" sign). Other control variables
have the expected and often signiﬁcant eﬀects. For instance, a higher gap in school
enrolment, investment and urban population to the G7 countries leads to higher income
gaps. Not surprisingly, tropical countries or countries in Sub-Saharian Africa are on
average poorer.31
< Figure 3 here >
We next provide evidence which supports Hypothesis 1d. Fig. 3 provides the scatter
plot for changes in emigration rates and changes in income gaps (to the median income
of the G7) between 1990 and 2000 for our sample of 77 countries (not controlling for
other factors). The correlation coeﬃcient is almost .5 and highly signiﬁcant.
< Table 5 here >
Tab. 5 accounts for the endogeneity of both DeltaMig and DeltaGDPgap and
their interaction. It presents the results on the structural equation model (21) and
31Latitude has no eﬀect, however. We also experimented with inclusion of a dummy for East Asian
Paciﬁc countries, which however turned out to be unimportant (not shown).
25(22), including those from the Hausman tests. From the upper table we ﬁnd that an
increase in DeltaGDPgap positively aﬀe c t st h ec h a n g ei ne m i g r a t i o nr a t e s( δ1 > 0); δ1
is statistically diﬀerent from zero below the one percent level in all speciﬁcations. Also
the eﬀect of a higher DeltaMig on a change in the income gap is positive (ν1 > 0)
and highly signiﬁcant in all 3SLS estimates (but less signiﬁcant in 2SLS). In this second
equation we also control for the initial GDP per capita gap (in 1990) as a "catch-all"
variable for other sources (than changes in emigration rates) for changes in income gaps.
Although GDPgap1990 is highly related to DeltaMig (according to the test results
of Hypothesis 1b presented in Tab. 3), the coeﬃcient on DeltaMig and its level of
statistical signiﬁcance is largely unchanged when GDPgap1990 is included.32
Looking at the p-values of the Hausman test statistics suggests that instrumenting is
generally crucial and the instruments are chosen in an acceptable way. The instruments
also seem to be well correlated with the endogenous variables (see notes to Tab. 5).
The comparison between the 2SLS and the 3SLS estimator indicates that it is prefer-
able to use the 3SLS estimator as the p-value is always well above the 10-%-level. This
suggests, in sum, that the relationship between DeltaMig and DeltaGDPgap is not
only positive but also highly signiﬁcant in both directions (columns (1), (3), (5)).
< Figure 4 here >
We ﬁnally come to evidence on our Hypothesis 2 on changes in emigration rates
(DeltaMig) and changes in (optimal) public infrastructure investment ( ˆ G). According
to Proposition 3, the variables are negatively related, i.e., countries with increased em-
igration after an exogenous shock are expected to decrease public investment. Fig. 4
suggests that this is indeed the case. Panel (a) shows that the relationship between
DeltaMig and the change between 1990 and 2000 in government investment over GDP
in the OECD. Panels (b) and (c) show that, for a broader set of countries, DeltaMig
is also negatively related to the change government acquisition of ﬁxed assets over GDP
32The coeﬃcient on GDPgap1990 is only once, in column (3) of Tab. 5, statistically diﬀerent from
zero (and negative, which points to convergence among countries). Going from 3SLS to 2SLS (column
(4)) or including geographical variables (columns (5) and (6)), it loses signiﬁcance, however.
26and government capital expenditure over GDP. Measuring the public investment vari-
ables per worker (unlike in Fig. 4) rather than as a fraction of GDP changes the results
only slightly. The correlation coeﬃcient of DeltaMig and a change in government in-
vestment per worker in the OECD becomes -0.519 (p-value=0.016) and the correlation
between DeltaMig and change in government acquisition of ﬁxed assets per worker is
-0.520 (p-value=0.011). However, the correlation between DeltaMig and government
capital expenditure per worker drops to -0.132 (p-value=0.444).33
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper analyzed the relationship between migration of high-skilled individuals, in-
come gaps to potential host or source economies, and the optimal change in public
infrastructure investment in response to endogenously changed migration ﬂows. We
showed that a decline in mobility costs increases emigration pressure for economies al-
ready suﬀering from brain drain, while beneﬁtting those which were host economies to
begin with. This holds true with and without optimal adjustment of public investment,
suggesting that integration of labor markets for the highly skilled accentuates between-
country income inequality. Higher outward migration is also associated with downward
adjustment of public infrastructure investment. Cross-country evidence supports these
theoretical hypotheses. As a caveat, we are well aware of the need to analyze data on
net rather than gross emigration rates. Unfortunately, such a dataset is yet not avail-
able. Moreover, the 10 year period we are able to focus on in the empirical analysis may
be too short to capture all relevant changes. One cannot rule out, for instance, that
Eastern European countries which have seen a large outﬂow of skilled workers after 1990
may beneﬁt in the longer run from return migration, remittances, or increased education
levels.
Overall, we focussed on (and found evidence for) adverse brain drain eﬀects. This
matches with conjectures of policy makers in the EU. For instance, at a press conference
33One easily ﬁnds that the lower correlation coeﬃcient is entirely due to one outlier: Iceland. Dropping
Iceland we obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of -0.428 which again is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the
one percent level.
27on October 23, 2007, the president of the European Commission discussed the EU "blue
card" initiative by pointing out: “With regard to developing countries we are very much
aware of the need to avoid negative "brain drain" eﬀects. Therefore, the proposal pro-
motes ethical recruitment standards to limit — if not ban — active recruitment by Member
States in developing countries in some sensitive sectors” (SPEECH/07/650, p.3). The
q u e s t i o ni sw h e t h e ra tt h es a m et i m et h ep e r s i s t e n to u t ﬂows of researchers and profes-
sional to, for instance, North America can be reversed. Our analysis cautions to have
too optimistic expectations.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .First, note that the inverse demand function of the ﬁnal goods
sector for input Z is given by pZ =( 1 −α)Y/Z[≡ ∂Y/∂Z]. Substituting pZ =( 1 −α)Y/Z
into w = pZ∂Z/∂HZ and using (2), we have w = β(1 − α)Y/HZ. According to (1), (3)
and x(j)=α
2
1−αa(h)Z we ﬁnd Y = α
2α
1−αZna(h) for ﬁnal output and thus













HZ.( 2 4 )






HZ, according to (2). Combining this with w(1 − ¯ e)=q,w eﬁnd that
LZ = L =
1 − β
β(1 − ¯ e)
HZ. (25)
Substituting (24) and (25) into (10) and using that (h + f)a0(h)/a(h)=1 ,w ec a ns o l v e
for HZ:
HZ =
β(1 − ¯ e)
1+α
(1 − m). (26)




β(1 − ¯ e)
¶1−β β(1 − ¯ e)
1+α
(1 − m). (27)
Substituting (27) into (7), w = δZa0(h),c o n ﬁrms (11). To derive (12), substitute
(26) into (25) and use H =1− L. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .We start with part (i). If m ≥ m and therefore χ ≥ 1,t h e n
m = Φ(χ − 1), according to (13). Thus, according to (16) and Φ0(χ − 1) = ϕ(χ − 1),
Mm(m,G, ¯ wnet)=ϕ(˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet) − 1)˜ χm (m,G, ¯ wnet). (28)
Since ˜ χm = −¯ wnetWm/W2 > 0, according to (15), we ﬁnd Mm > 0. Moreover, (28) im-
plies Mmm = ϕ0(˜ χ−1)(˜ χm)
2+ϕ(χ−1)˜ χmm,w h e r e˜ χmm =[ 2 ( Wm)2 − WmmW]¯ wnet/W 3.
It is easy to see from (14) that Wmm < 0;t h u s ,˜ χmm > 0.T o g e t h e rw i t h˜ χm > 0,t h i s
conﬁrms that Mmm > 0 if ϕ0(˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet) − 1) ≥ 0, concluding the proof of part (i).
Part (ii) follows from using (15) and m = −I(χ) if χ<1, according to (13). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Follows immediately from the discussion in the main text.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .The ﬁrst-order condition to the maximization of ˆ W(G, ¯ wnet)=
˜ W(ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet),G) reads
h
ˆ WG(G, ¯ wnet)=
i
˜ Wm(ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet),G)ˆ mG(G, ¯ wnet)+ ˜ WG(ˆ m(G, ¯ wnet),G)=0 . (29)
If ˆ m ≥ 0, by applying the implicit function theorem to (16), we obtain:
ˆ mG(G, ¯ wnet)=
ϕ(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet) − 1)˜ χG(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)
1 − Mm(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)
. (30)
Note that the denominator is positive in stable equilibrium, i.e., Mm(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet) < 1.I f
ˆ m<0, by applying the implicit function theorem to m+I(˜ χ(m,G, ¯ wnet)) = 0 (use part
29(ii) of Lemma 2), we ﬁnd
ˆ mG(G, ¯ wnet)=−
I0(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet))˜ χG (ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)
1+I0(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet))˜ χm(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)
. (31)
Again, in stable equilibrium, the denominator is positive. Moreover, using ˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)=
¯ wnet/ ˜ W(ˆ m,G) from (15), we ﬁnd
˜ χG
¡





˜ WG(ˆ m,G). (32)
Suppose that ˆ G is given by ﬁrst-order condition (29). (At the end of the proof we
show that the second-order condition indeed holds.) Substituting (30) into (29) and
using (32), we ﬁnd that whenever the optimal public investment level, ˆ G,i sa s s o c i a t e d
with emigration, then ˆ G is given by
Ã
1 −
˜ Wm(ˆ m, ˆ G)ϕ(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet) − 1) ¯ wnet
[1 − Mm(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)] ˜ W(ˆ m,G)2
!
˜ WG(ˆ m, ˆ G)=0 .( 3 3 )
As the term in large brackets is positive in stable equilibrium (use Mm < 1 and ˜ Wm < 0),
ˆ G is given by ˜ WG(ˆ m, ˆ G)=0 , which holds if and only if ˆ mG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)=0 , according to
(30) and (32).
Similarly, using (31) and (32), the ﬁrst-order condition (29) can be rewritten to
Ã
1+
˜ Wm(ˆ m, ˆ G)I0(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet))¯ wnet
[1 + I0(˜ χ(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet))˜ χm(ˆ m,G, ¯ wnet)] ˜ W(ˆ m,G)2
!
˜ WG(ˆ m, ˆ G)=0 . (34)
Again, the term in large brackets is positive in stable equilibrium (use I0 < 0, ˜ Wm < 0
and 1+I0(˜ χ)˜ χm > 0). Thus, again, ˆ G is given by ˜ WG(ˆ m, ˆ G)=0 , which holds if and
only if ˆ mG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)=0 , according to (31) and (32).
We next show that the second-order condition holds, i.e., ˆ WGG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) < 0. To see
t h i s ,n o t et h a tw ej u s te s t a b l i s h e dt h a t ˆ WG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)= ˜ WG(ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet), ˆ G)=0when ˆ G
30is given by ﬁrst-order condition (29). Hence,
ˆ WGG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)= ˜ WGm(ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet), ˆ G)ˆ mG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)+ ˜ WGG(ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet), ˆ G). (35)




˜ WGG < 0 conﬁrms that the second-order condition holds.
Finally, we have to show that ˆ mGG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) > 0 holds, which means that emigration
from a source economy (ˆ m>0) is minimized and immigration to a host economy (I =
−ˆ m) is maximized. From (32) and ˜ WG
¯ ¯ ¯
G= ˆ G
=0we have ˜ χG|G= ˆ G =0and ˜ χGG|G= ˆ G =
h
−¯ wnet ˜ WGG/ ˜ W
i¯ ¯ ¯
G= ˆ G
> 0. ˜ WGG < 0 implies ˜ χGG|G= ˆ G > 0. This property will now be
used. We start with emigration, ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) ≥ 0. According to (30) and ˜ χG|G= ˆ G =0 ,w e
obtain
ˆ mGG( ˆ G, ¯ wnet)=
∙
ϕ(˜ χ − 1)˜ χGG
1 − Mm
¸¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
G= ˆ G
> 0 (36)
by using ˜ χGG|G= ˆ G > 0 and the fact that the denominator is positive in stable equilibrium.
Similarly, when ˆ m( ˆ G, ¯ wnet) < 0, then (31) and ˜ χG|G= ˆ G =0imply




¸¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
G= ˆ G
> 0 (37)
by using I0 < 0, ˜ χGG|G= ˆ G > 0 and the fact that the denominator is positive. This
concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that ˜ WGm = WBmb0 + WGm.F r o m ( 1 4 ) , w e h a v e
WBm < 0 and WGm < 0, which implies ˜ WGm < 0. The result follows from the discussion
in the main text. ¥
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Supplementary Material: The Structural Equation Model
I nt h es t r u c t u r a le q u a t i o nm o d e l( H y p o t h e s i s1 d ) ,w eh a v et w oe q u a t i o n si no u r
system, (21) and (22). Let us write them more generally as
yk = Ykβk + Xkγk + ui
= Tkδk + uk, k ∈ {1,2},w i t hTk ≡ (Yk Xk), δk ≡ (βk γk)
where yk is the N × 1 vector of observations on the endogenous variable in equation
k =1 ,2, Yk is the N × 1 vector of observations on the endogenous variable included
as a regressor in equation k,a n dXk is the N × M matrix of observations on the M
34predetermined variables in equation k. The two equations can always be written as
























We assume that u ∼ (0,Σ2×2 ⊗ IN),w h e r eΣ2×2 is a variance-covariance matrix with
constant variances of u1, u2,a n dIN is the N × N identity matrix.
In the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,w er e g r e s sf o r( k =1 ,2) Yk on X1, X2 and Yj, j 6= k,i no r d e r
to obtain estimates ˆ Y1, ˆ Y2. In the second stage, the endogenous variable of equation k,
yk is regressed on ˆ Yk as well as the predetermined variables of this equation, Xk.T h i s
leads to estimators ˆ δ1, ˆ δ2. In the case of a three stage estimation, we form an estimate









Data description and sources 
Variable Description  and  source  Range  Mean  S.d. 
Mig1990  Stock of emigration of educational category 
“high” divided by stock of individuals aged 25+ of 
the educational category “high” in 1990 (in 
percent). Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
[0.46, 52.52]  12.920  11.566 
Mig2000  As above but for year 2000. Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006). 
[0.17, 44.17]  12.460  10.750 
DeltaMig Mig2000 minus Mig1990. [-13.57,  18.52]  0.460  4.806 
GDPgap1990  Log GDP per capita gap to median log GDP per 
capita of G7 countries in 1990. Penn World Table 
Version 6.2. 
[-0.23, 3.95]  1.420  1.183 
GDPgap2000  As above but for year 2000. Penn World Table 
Version 6.2. 
[-0.32, 3.89]  1.415  1.253 
DeltaGDPgap GDPgap2000  minus GDPgap1990 [-0.423,  0.611]  -0.0046  0.2069 
PrimSchoolGap1990  Primary school enrolment gap to median of G7 
countries in 1990. Global Development Finance 
& World Development Indicators. 
[-20.4, 74.2]  6.501  18.321 
TertSchoolGap1990  Tertiary school enrolment gap to median of G7 
countries in 1990. Global Development Finance 
& World Development Indicators. 
[-60.8, 33.6]  15.240  17.696 
InvestGap1990  Investment share gap to median of G7 countries 
in 1990. Penn World Table Version 6.2. 
[-22.98, 23.43]  9.017  9.853 
UrbanGap1990  Urban population share gap to median of G7 
countries in 1990. Global Development Finance 
& World Development Indicators. 
[-23.42, 71.26]  23.390  26.730 
InvestS1990  Investment share in 1990. Penn World Table 
Version 6.2. 
[2.47, 48.88]  16.88  9.853 
LegalBritish  Legal origin: British. The World Bank.  {0, 1}  0.351  0.480 
LegalFrench  Legal origin: French. The World Bank.  {0, 1}  0.429  0.498 
Latitude  Latitude. The World Bank.  [-36.89, 63.89]  16.830  28.053 
Tropical  Tropical. The World Bank.  {0, 1}  0.455  0.501 
Pop  Population Size in 1990 (in thousands). Penn 
World Table Version 6.2. 
[254.8, 841700]  40740  102594 
RegionSsa  Region: Sub Sahara Africa. The World Bank.  {0, 1}  0.247  0.434 
Notes: The range, mean and standard deviations are based on 77 countries. Countries included in the sample: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 b 
Table 2 





























































multiple R2  0.0636  0.1154 0.1762 0.1952 0.2144 0.2204 
N  77 77 77 77 77  25  (OECD)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c 




















































Pop   2.76E-07
(2.00E-6) 
      






















multiple R2  0.1024  0.1024  0.1123 0.1137 0.1987 0.1883  0.0653 
N  77 77 77 77 77 77  25  (OECD)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































        
Hausman test (p-value)  0.3193 0.0332 0.1965 
        

























































        
Hausman test (p-value)  0.5735 0.5391 0.2733 
Hausman (2SLS vs 3SLS)  0.3579  0.4477  0.2831 
N  77 77 77 
Notes:  a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 
and 10 %. The Hausman test for endogeneity is carried out by running an auxiliary regression. In the first regression, the suspect endogenous 
variable is regressed on all exogenous variables and the instrument to retrieve the residuals. Then in the second regression, the residuals are 
included as additional regressors in the estimation of interest. If the estimates are consistent, then the coefficient on the first stage residuals 
should not be significantly different from zero. Here we report the p-value for the coefficient of the residuals. In the first equation the variable 
DeltaGDPgap is instrumented by the variable InvestS1990. The correlation coefficient of these two measures is rho=-0.2766 p-value=0.0148. In 
the second equation the variable DeltaMig is instrumented by the variable Mig1990. The correlation coefficient of these two measures is rho= 





Migration in equilibrium for given public investment 
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Figure 2 
Welfare as a function of G for a given migration flow, m2 > m1 
 
 
) , ( ~
1 G m W
) , ( ~
2 G m W
Gh 
Figure 3 
Correlation between changes in income gaps and changes in emigration  rates 
 
Notes: rho represents the Spearman correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of the correlation.  i 
Figure 4 
Correlation between changes in public investment levels (as fraction of GDP) and 
changes in emigration rates 
 
 
Notes: rho represents the Spearman correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of the correlation. The 
government investment data for the first plot comes from the OECD databases. Government investment data for the other two plots was 
obtained from the IMF Government Financial Statistics from 1990 to 1992 and 1999 to 2001 (missing data matched with nearest year).  
 
 
 